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ABSTRACT: Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is an emerging cybersecurity
technology which exploits the laws of quantum mechanics to generate shared
secret keying material between two geographically separated parties. The
unique nature of QKD shows promise for high-security applications such as
those found in banking, government, and military environments. However,
real-world QKD systems contain a variety of implementation non-idealities
which can negatively impact system security and performance. This article
provides an introduction to QKD for security professionals and describes
recent developments in the field. Additionally, comments are offered on QKD’s
advantages (i.e., the boon), its drawbacks (i.e., the bust), and its foreseeable
viability as a cybersecurity technology.
uantum Key Distribution (QKD) is an emerging cybersecurity technology which
provides the means for two geographically separated parties to grow “unconditionally
secure” symmetric cryptographic keying material. Unlike traditional key distribution
techniques, the security of QKD rests on the laws of quantum mechanics and not
computational complexity. This unique aspect of QKD is due to the fact that any
unauthorized eavesdropping on the key distribution channel necessarily introduces detectable
errors (Gisin, Ribordy, Tittel, & Zbinden, 2002). This attribute makes QKD desirable for highsecurity environments such as banking, government, and military applications. However, QKD
is a nascent technology where implementation non-idealities can negatively impact system
performance and security (Mailloux, Grimaila, Hodson, Baumgartner, & McLaughlin, 2015).
While the QKD community is making progress towards the viability of QKD solutions, it is
clear that more work is required to quantify the impact of such non-idealities in real-world QKD
systems (Scarani & Kurtsiefer, 2009).
Written for security practitioners, managers, and decision makers, this article provides an
accessible introduction to QKD and describes this seemingly strange quantum communications
protocol in readily understandable terms. Additionally, this article highlights recent developments
in the field from the 5th international Quantum Cryptography conference (QCrypt) hosted in fall
of 2015 with an eye towards the US hosted conference in 2016. Lastly, we comment on several of
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QKD’s advantages (i.e., the boon) and its drawbacks (i.e., the bust)
while also considering QKD’s viability as a cybersecurity technology.

What is QKD?

The genesis of QKD traces back to the late 1960s, when Stephen
Wiesner first proposed the idea of encoding information on
photons to securely transfer messages (Wiesner, 1983). In 1984,
the physicist Charles Bennett and cryptographer Gilles Brassard
worked together to mature this idea by introducing the first QKD
protocol, known as “BB84” (Bennett & Brassard, 1984). Five years
later, they built the first QKD prototype system which was said to
be “secure against any eavesdropper who happened to be deaf ” as it
made audible noises while encoding crypto key onto single photons
(Brassard, 2006). From its relatively humble beginnings, QKD has
gained global interest as a unique cybersecurity solution with active
research groups across North America, Europe, Australia, and Asia.
Moreover, commercial offerings are now available from several
vendors around the world: ID Quantique, SeQureNet, Quintessence
Labs, MagiQ Technologies, Qasky Quantum Science Technology,
and QuantumCTek (Oesterling, Hayford, & Friend, 2012).
Figure 1 illustrates a notional QKD system architecture consisting
of a sender “Alice,” a receiver “Bob,” a quantum channel (an optical
fiber or line-of-sight free space path), and a classical channel (a
conventional network connection). Alice is shown with a laser
source configured to generate single photons, while Bob measures
them using specialized Single Photon Detectors (SPDs). The QKD
system provides a point-to-point solution for generating shared
secret key, , which can be used to encrypt sensitive data, voice, or
video communications as desired by the user.

Commercial QKD systems often use the secret key to increase
the security posture of traditional symmetric encryption algorithms
through frequent re-keying. For example, a QKD system can be
used to update a 256-bit AES key once a second. This increases the
cryptosystem’s security posture by significantly reducing the time and
information available to an adversary for performing cryptanalysis.
Alternatively, QKD systems can be used to provide an unlimited
supply of secret keying material for use in the one-time pad
encryption algorithm – the only known cryptosystem to achieve
perfect secrecy (Vernam, 1926), (Shannon, 1949). However, the
one-time pad has strict keying requirements, which are not easy to
meet with conventional technologies. More specifically, the keying
material must be: 1. truly random, 2. never reused, and 3. as long as
the message to be encrypted. Thus, the appeal of QKD is found in
its ability to generate (or grow) shared cryptographic key, making
unbreakable one-time pad encryption configurations possible.

How Does QKD Work?

To understand how QKD works, we describe the original BB84
prepare-and-measure, polarization-based protocol as it remains a
popular implementation choice and is relatively easy to understand
compared to other QKD protocols (Gisin, Ribordy, Tittel, &
Zbinden, 2002).
Figure 2 illustrates the QKD protocol as a series of eight steps.
While these steps (or processes) can be depicted in a number of ways,
we have chosen this flow to clearly illustrate how the QKD protocol
behaves. In an actual system, these steps would most likely overlap
and/or execute in parallel. Note that Quantum Exchange is the only
step where the laws of quantum mechanics are directly applicable.

Figure. 1. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) system context diagram. The sender “Alice” and receiver “Bob” are configured to generate
shared secret key for use in bulk encryptors, where the quantum channel (i.e., a free space or optical fiber link) is used to securely
transmit single photons and the classical channel is used to control specific QKD processes and protocols.
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1. Authenticate parties
● Identify users
● Verify users
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2. Quantum Exchange
3. Sift non-matching detections
● Exchange basis information
● Confirm basis selection
● Calculate other parameters

3. Sift Detections

4. Error Estimation
5. Error reconcilation
● Identify/Correct errors
● Calculate actual qubit
error rate (QBER)
● Check QBER threshold

4. Estimate quantum error rate
● Select detections to compare
● Calculate preliminary error rate
● Check error rate threshold

5. Error Reconciliation

6. Entropy Estimation
7. Amplift security of key
● Manipulate key bits
● Reduce key size

2. Exchange quantim bits (qubits)
● Generate/Modulate qubits
● Transmit qubits
● Detect qubits

6. Estimate information loss
● Account for loss sources
● Calculate loss estimate

7. Privacy Amplification

8. Key Generation

8. Deliver final key
● Compute/Compare hashes
● Deliver keys to encryptors

Legend
Quantum Step
Classical Step

Figure. 2. Eight steps of the Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) process.

Somewhat of a misnomer, most of the QKD protocol is achieved
through classical information theory “post-processing” steps.
In step 1, Alice and Bob authenticate with each other to ensure
they are communicating with the expected party. Typically, this
authentication is accomplished with the lesser known WegmanCarter authentication technique to meet QKD’s unconditional
security claim (Scarani, et al., 2009). Moreover, unlike most cyber
systems which authenticate only when initiating communications,
QKD systems often utilize a transactional authentication scheme
where authentication occurs after each step (or a sequence of steps)
according to the specific system implementation.
Table 1. The prepare and measure, polarization-based BB84 QKD protocol.
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During quantum exchange (step 2), Alice prepares single
photons, known as quantum bits or “qubits,” in one of four
polarization states |↔⟩, |↕⟩, |⤢⟩, or |⤡⟩. The photon’s polarization
state is prepared according to a randomly selected basis and bit
value as shown in Table 1. Each photon is then transmitted to
Bob through the quantum channel, where it can be subject to
significant loss (e.g., >90% loss is common). This is due to the
loss that is experienced by single photons when they propagate
over long distances through optical fiber or line-of-sight free
space links. Due to the inherent challenges of single photon
propagation, a majority of Alice’s photons are lost during
transmission, thereby limiting the system’s effective operational
distance to <100 km (Scarani, et al., 2009).
Assuming Alice’s encoded photon arrives at Bob, he must
randomly select a measurement basis for each detected photon.
If Bob measures the photon with the correctly matching basis,
the encoded bit value (0 or 1) is obtained with a high degree
of confidence. Conversely, if Bob measures the photon with the
incorrect basis, a random result occurs and the originally prepared
bit value is destroyed. This quantum mechanical phenomenon
underpins QKD’s secure key generation where measuring a
photon in flight forces its encoded state to collapse and prevents
accurate copies from being made (i.e., the No Cloning Theorem)
(Wootters & Zurek, 1982). Quantum exchange results in a series
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of detections at Bob, which need to be correlated with Alice’s
sent photons through a sifting process.
In step 3, Bob’s detections are sifted to eliminate incorrect (nonmatching) basis measurements. In general, 50% of Bob’s detections
will be in the wrong basis and sifted out because of his random basis
selection. This results in a shared sifted key, known as the “raw key,”
in both Alice and Bob approximately half the size of Bob’s initial
set of detections.
Next, an estimate of the quantum exchange error rate is
calculated in step 4. Typically, a random percentage of bits are
selected and compared over the classical channel. The estimated
error rate is used to inform the error reconciliation technique
(step 5), and can also be used to conduct an initial security check.
This step is particularly important for QKD’s theoretical security
posture as all errors during quantum exchange are attributed
to eavesdroppers since the QKD protocol cannot discriminate
between noise and malicious interference. Thus, if the estimated
error rate exceeds the predetermined QKD error threshold (e.g.,
11%), the raw key must be discarded as an adversary is assumed
to be listening (Scarani, et al., 2009). Typically, the key generation
is then restarted.
In step 5, error reconciliation is performed to correct any errors
in Alice and Bob’s raw keys. Due to device non-idealities and
physical disturbances during quantum exchange, expected error
rates are typically 3-5% (Gisin, Ribordy, Tittel, & Zbinden, 2002).
Error reconciliation techniques employ specialize bi-directional
correction algorithms (e.g., Winnow, Cascade, or Low-Density
Parity-Check) to minimize the amount of information “leaked”
over the classical channel to eavesdroppers (Scarani, et al., 2009).
With a high probability, this step results in a perfectly matched,
error free shared secret key between Alice and Bob. The error
reconciliation step results in a formalized Quantum Bit Error Rate
(QBER), which is again checked against the QKD security proof
threshold (e.g., 11%) to determine if an eavesdropper is listening
on the quantum key distribution channel (Scarani, et al., 2009).
If the security threshold is exceeded, the key must be discarded
and the process is restarted.
Next, entropy estimation (step 6) accounts for the amount of
secret key information leaked while executing the QKD protocol
steps. For example, during quantum exchange, information leakage
occurs from non-ideal laser sources which produce insecure
multi-photon pulses. In another example, error reconciliation
communications over the classical channel leaks information about
the secret key. In general, conservative loss estimates are made;
however, implementations may differ considerably (Slutsky, Rao,
Sun, Tancevski, & Fainman, 1998). The entropy estimate is then
passed to the privacy amplification step, which corrects for the
information leakage and ensures the eavesdropper has negligible
information regarding the QKD-generated shared secret key.
More specifically, step 7 employs advanced information theory
techniques such as a universal hash function to produce a more
secure final shared secret key (Scarani, et al., 2009).
Lastly, in order to ensure the final symmetric crypto keys are the
same, a hash of Alice and Bob’s keys are compared. If they match,
the keys are delivered to the system owner. These unconditionally

secure shared symmetric keys can then be used as desired by
the user to protect sensitive information with the unbreakable
one-time pad encryption scheme or supplement more practical
encryption schemes such as AES. For readers interested in more
details, a security-oriented description of QKD is available in
(Mailloux, Grimaila, Hodson, Baumgartner, & McLaughlin, 2015)
with comprehensive physics based discussions in (Scarani, et al.,
2009) and (Gisin, Ribordy, Tittel, & Zbinden, 2002).

Figure 3. The ID Quantique (IDQ) rack mountable QKD system is shown on
the top (ID Quantique, 2016) and the Toshiba record holding hybrid QKD
system is shown on the bottom (Dixon, et al., 2015).

Observations from Quantum Cryptography
Conference (QCrypt) 2015

Over the past several years, the annual QCrypt conference has
served as the world’s premier forum for students and researchers
to present and collaborate on all aspects of quantum cryptography.
QCrypt is also the primary forum for announcing the year’s best
QKD results. In late 2015, the fifth QCrypt conference was hosted
in Tokyo, Japan and attended by more than 275 participants with a
largely international audience of physicists, information theorists,
and cryptographers (Quantum Cryptography Conference, 2016).
From this conference, key observations are offered for the reader
to gain perspective on recent developments in the quantum
cryptography field.
ii

Striving for Commercial Viability – QCr ypt 2105
began with several demonstrations and talks focused on
practically-oriented QKD systems which balance cost,
performance, and security trades towards affordability.
In particular, the QKD industry leader, ID Quantique,
unveiled a completely redesigned QKD blade system which
employs a new quantum exchange protocol, anti-tamper
precautions, and additional security features to mitigate
quantum attacks (ID Quantique, 2016). Likewise, Toshiba
Research Laboratory Europe, supported by Japan’s National
Institute of Information and Communications Technology,
prominently displayed their record breaking QKD system.
The Toshiba system boasts the world’s highest key rates,
improved user interface, and automated synchronization for
increased usability over metropolitan distances (Dixon, et
al., 2015). Unlike early experimental QKD configurations,
these systems are designed to be rack mountable and more
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easily integratable into existing communications structures.
Figure 3 shows both the commercially viable ID Quantique
and Toshiba QKD systems.
Fielding QKD Networks – For distributed networks and
long distance operation, QKD requires the use of either
quantum repeaters or satellite-based solutions. While fully
functional quantum repeaters are years away from being
realized, simpler stop-gap “trusted node” configurations have
been successfully fielded (Scarani, et al., 2009). These QKD
networks utilize a series of back-to-back QKD systems
to cover larger metropolitan areas and support long-haul
backbone distances. Using this method, China is building
the world’s largest QKD network along its west coast
employing 46 nodes to cover some 2,000 km (Wang, et al.,
2014). Similarly, one of the conference’s keynotes, the US
research organization Battelle, described their development
of trusted nodes with ID Quantique to support a 1,000 km
planned run from Columbus, Ohio to Washington, D.C.
(Quantum Cryptography Conference, 2016). With respect
to satellite-to-ground QKD, research centers in America,
Canada, Europe, Japan, and China are exploring the feasibility
of and conducting experiments to prove the feasibility of
transmitting single photons from a Low Earth Orbit (LEO)
satellite through the Earth’s turbulent atmosphere. Most
notably, China is actively pursuing their goal of launching a
QKD satellite by 2016 (Bieve, 2016). Figure 4 depicts both
China’s terrestrial QKD network and their planned spacebased QKD links.
Barriers to Acceptance – While a majority of the researchfocused conference is focused on improvements to QKD
protocols, quantum hardware, and information theory
advancements, arguably, the most important theme of the
conference pertained to the acceptance of QKD (or lack
thereof ) as a cybersecurity solution. As repeatedly recognized
during QCrypt 2015, several significant barriers to QKD’s
acceptance exist. This was perhaps best captured by the field’s
most recognized researcher, Dr. Nicolas Gisin, who boldly
stated “The quantum technology era has started… In 10 years
either QKD will have found its markets or will be dead” (Gisin,
2015). In a cybersecurity community that typically adopts
new technological solutions rather quickly, quantum based
security technologies are slow to be adopted. Perhaps, security
professionals are uncomfortable with the topic of quantum
mechanics? Or perhaps, QKD developers are just now starting
to make progress on critical implementation security issues,
interoperability standards, and formal certifications (ETSI,
2015).

From these overarching conference themes, we next elaborate
on some of QKD’s advantages and disadvantages in order to help
security professionals better understand the technology and its
application. Thus, while a bit subjective in nature, and not without
debate, we’ve chosen to describe three ways in which QKD is a boon
to the cybersecurity community and three ways in which it is a bust.
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The Boon

While there are several ways to describe the advantages of QKD,
in this article the authors’ have chosen to approach this challenge
from the user’s perspective. Meaning, we desire to provide a useful
commentary which addresses the utility of QKD (and its related
developments) for an end user and not merely elaborate on the
merits of its research or what it could be.
1.

2.

3.

Generates Unconditionally Secure Keying Material –
Leveraging the laws of quantum mechanics, QKD is the
only known means which can grow unlimited amounts of
symmetric keying material to effectively employ the one-time
pad cryptosystem (the only unbreakable encryption scheme
known). This formalized information-theoretic security
foundation is much stronger than conventional encryption
techniques which depend on demonstrated computational
complexity. This is precisely why QKD has gained global
recognition as an emerging cybersecurity technology in the
face of quantum computing advances which threaten other
conventional cryptosystems such as RSA.
Quantum Random Number Generators – In order to maintain
their information-theoretic security posture, QKD systems
require true sources of randomness. Thus, the advancement of
QKD has successfully facilitated the development of quantum
random number generators. These devices provide a physical
source of randomness based on quantum phenomenon which
is desirable for cryptographic devices, software applications, and
other industries. Of note, the gaming/gambling industry is said
to be the world’s largest consumer of random number generators
and a fiscally rewarding enterprise. While QKD upstarts seem
to come and go, there is a definite need for cheap and reliable
sources of entropy in the commercial market.
Strengthens the Cybersecurity Field – QKD encourages
multidisciplinary collaboration amongst information theorists,
engineers, cryptography experts, security professionals, and
physicists that may not occur otherwise. Establishing these
types of interactions is critical for advancements in several
cyber related fields such as quantum communication, quantum
sensing, and quantum computing. For example, the integration
of computer scientists and quantum physicists is necessary
for the development and utilization of quantum computing
algorithms. On a related note, QKD has also brought
about the occurrence of “Quantum Hacking” (Institute of
Quantum Computing, University of Waterloo, 2014). This
growing specialty area is testing the security of new quantum
technologies and protocols, and perhaps someday, we’ll even
have security assessments which include quantum red teams.

The Bust

QKD systems have performance limitations, device non-idealities,
and system vulnerabilities which are not well understood (Scarani
& Kurtsiefer, 2009). Thus, potential users often question both the
effectiveness of the technology and its system security posture. For
QKD to be accepted as a cybersecurity technology the following
critical issues (at a minimum) should be addressed.
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Figure 4. China’s 46 node terrestrial QKD network is shown on the left and the planned space-based QKD
network is shown on the right (Quantum Cryptography Conference, 2016).

1.

2.

3.

QKD is Point-to-Point Technology – Because QKD is a
point-to-point solution, it does not scale well for modern
communications infrastructures. While gains are being made
towards networked key management solutions, they are
fundamentally limited by QKD’s quantum underpinnings,
which prevent the amplification of single photons (Wootters
& Zurek, 1982). Given this critical limitation, QKD does not
appear to be a good fit for wide scale implementation and
may only be viable for specialized two site applications such
as encrypted voice communications in a metropolitan area.
Implementation Security Vulnerabilities – QKD systems
have implementation non-idealities which introduce
vulnerabilities and negatively impact both performance and
security. For example, these “unconditionally secure” QKD
systems protocols are vulnerable to attacks over the quantum
channel, including man-in-the-middle (authentication
failures), intercept/resend (measuring and replacing photons),
photon number splitting (stealing photons), and blinding
optical receivers (unauthorized laser sources). Additionally,
QKD systems are also vulnerable to common cybersecurity
attacks against computers, applications, and protocols.
These implementation security issues and their resulting
vulnerabilities must be well-studied and addressed through
established architectural design principles, verifiable designs,
and assured operational configurations to provide trustworthy
systems to end users.
No Formal Certification Method – As high-security crypto
devices, QKD systems should undergo formal security
assessments and certification processes to address (at a

minimum) physical attacks, side channel analysis, and data
manipulation. However, within the QKD community there
is little discussion thereof, and arguably sluggish progress
towards an independent certification process (ETSI, 2015).
Furthermore, QKD developers must adopt a more holistic
view of security including proactive techniques such as
assuring secure operational baselines and continuous
monitoring of the system’s communication links.
Despite QKD's drawbacks, the technology does show promise
as an enabler to unbreakable encryption (i.e., generating unlimited
amounts of random key for use in On-Time Pad encryption) for
niche applications such as point-to-point communications and
data transfer.

Conclusion

Security professionals recognize that ongoing advancements
in quantum computing (along with Shor’s algorithm for quickly
factoring large prime numbers) threaten the security of modern
public key cryptography techniques such as RSA (Monz, et al.,
2015). Thus, new post-quantum security solutions need to be given
serious consideration as indicated by the National Security Agency’s
recent announcement specifying “a transition to quantum resistant
algorithms” for their cryptographic Suite B algorithms (NSA, 2015).
While this transition will occur slowly over time, organizations with
significant data protection requirements such as the US Government
(i.e., 25 years of data protection) must start thinking about postquantum crypto solutions now.
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While unbreakable one-time pad encryption solutions enabled by
QKD provide the ultimate protection available (they are proven secure
against advances in quantum computing), they do not fit well into
the established communications infrastructure. Conversely, quantum
resistant algorithms (encryption techniques which are shown to not
be easily broken by quantum computers) have the benefit of fitting
nicely into the existing infrastructure (Bernstein, 2009).
With an eye towards QCrypt 2016, hosted by the US based Joint
Center for Quantum Information and Computer Science, perhaps
the QKD community will begin to adopt a wider perspective on
the field of quantum cryptography. For example, the US’s premier
quantum center seeks to more broadly advance the state of the art
in quantum algorithms, quantum communication, and quantum
computing instead of merely focusing on QKD (University
of Maryland, 2016). Moreover, the US National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) recently stood up a multi-year
project to explore quantum resistant algorithms (2016) and a new
international conference series on post-quantum cryptography
is quickly gaining attention (2016). Perhaps, these events are
evidences that a change is occurring in the QKD community, an
evolution towards more viable cryptographic solutions. 
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